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Note
THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT:
INCENTIVE OR HINDRANCE FOR NEW LITERATURE?
SARAH E. ZYBERT
The Copyright Act provides incentives to stimulate the production of artistic
work for the good of the general public. These incentives include the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works, such as a sequel. This Note argues that in
practice, however, the right to prepare derivative works actually stifles creativity.
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company and Salinger v. Colting provide
examples of legal challenges to valuable work from new authors who wrote novels
based on previously published works. While both novels provided valuable
commentary and critique to previous works, existing copyright law only protected
one. In 2001, the Eleventh Circuit found in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Company that Alice Randall’s novel, The Wind Done Gone, was a parody of Gone
with the Wind, and therefore constituted fair use. In contrast, the Second Circuit
found in 2010 that Fredrik Colting would not succeed with a fair use defense
because his novel 60 Years Later, Coming Through the Rye was a sequel to J.D.
Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye with satiric elements, rather than a parody.
The existing regime fails to meet its intended goal of promoting the useful arts
for the public because works such as 60 Years Later, Coming Through the Rye are
prevented from distribution, even when the original author had no intent of
preparing any derivative works to benefit the public. This Note proposes two
suggestions to improve the system. First, this Note argues that the distinction
between parody and satire should be eliminated and both forms of commentary
should be given equal protection. Second, this Note argues that the intentions of
the copyright owner should be considered in determining the period of time the
owner is granted the exclusive right to prepare derivative works and within the
fair use analysis.
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THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT:
INCENTIVE OR HINDRANCE FOR NEW LITERATURE?
SARAH E. ZYBERT
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution calls for the promotion of the “Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”1 For copyright law to successfully achieve this goal, it must
maintain the delicate balance between creating incentives for authors to
produce new works and giving the public access to these works. This Note
examines one of these incentives, the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works, and how it stifles creativity to the detriment of the public.
In an attempt to balance the goals of copyright law, the Copyright Act
grants authors several exclusive rights, including the right to prepare
derivative works.2 As a limitation to these rights, the Copyright Act
recognizes a fair use defense, which “permits courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the
very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”3 This Note examines
two cases where the copyright owner of an original novel brought an
infringement action against subsequent writers for attempting to publish
unauthorized derivative works and where the subsequent authors raised the
fair use defense.4 Examining these two cases shows that fair use does not
always protect against the stifling of creativity. This Note proposes two
independent changes to the current regime that would diminish the
problems caused by the derivative work rights: first, the elimination of the
distinction between parodies and satires in the courts’ fair use analysis and
second, the consideration of the intentions of the copyright owner in
determining the length of the derivative work right and whether derivatives


Fairfield University, summa cum laude, B.A. 2009; University of Connecticut School of Law,
J.D. Candidate 2013. I would like to thank Professor Lewis Kurlantzick for providing thoughtful
feedback throughout the drafting of this Note. I would also like to thank the Connecticut Law Review
for their excellent work. Finally, I would like to thank my parents and Tony da Costa for their constant
support and encouragement.
1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating the exclusive rights of copyright owners).
3
Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.
1980).
4
See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2010); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (illustrating two similar legal battles about unauthorized
literary sequels).
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constitute fair use by the U.S. Copyright Office and the courts.
Part II provides an overview of the United States copyright system,
including a discussion of the exclusive right to prepare derivative works,
the period of copyright protection, the goals of the copyright system, and
tensions within the copyright system. Part III summarizes the district court
and court of appeals decisions in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.
and Salinger v. Colting, where the court in each case applied the fair use
analysis to allegedly infringing derivative works. Part IV explains why the
parody/satire dichotomy is problematic and proposes that courts should
eliminate the distinction when performing a fair use analysis. Finally, Part
V suggests that the U.S. Copyright Office and the courts should consider
the intentions of the copyright owner when determining the length of the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works and when conducting a fair use
analysis.
II. OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT
A. Exclusive Right to Prepare Derivative Works
Section 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act grants the owner of a copyright
the right to do and authorize the “reproduc[tion of] the copyrighted work in
copies” and the “prepar[ation of] derivative works.”5 The right to prepare
derivative works was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.6 American
copyright law originally only protected against the literal reproduction of a
work.7 United States copyright law “traces its source to British censorship
laws of the sixteenth century.”8 The Statute of Anne prevented publishers
from reproducing works without the original author’s consent.9 The
Statute of Anne strived “to encourage creativity and ensure that the public
would have free access to information by putting an end to the continued
use of copyright as a device of censorship.”10 This limited protection
against reproduction has gradually expanded in United States copyright
law. For example, in 1870, Congress gave authors “the right to dramatize
or translate.”11 A derivative work is now broadly defined as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
5

17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)–(2) (2006).
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006)).
7
Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 49
(2002).
8
ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (2d ed. 2006).
9
See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) (granting the author the sole right of printing his
or her book).
10
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
11
Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6
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a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative
work”.12
This definition gives copyright owners extensive control over the potential
exploitation of their work. In the context of literature, derivative works
include sequels.13 A sequel recasts, transforms, or adapts a preexisting
work.14 A derivative work right that is overly broad subverts the very
goals of copyright.
One argument for the expansion of copyright protection to include the
right to prepare derivative works is that the prospective profits from these
works are necessary to incentivize the production of the original.15 This
argument is only viable “where the projected economic gain from the
original work is less than its production costs, and the additional projected
gain from the derivative work is large enough to compensate the author for
the costs of producing both works.”16 Moreover, if the original author
chooses not to produce or license derivative works, even if it is
economically beneficial to do so, then clearly the derivative work right is
not a necessary incentive for the creation of the original work.17 This point
is manifested in J.D. Salinger’s insistence that there should be no
derivative works of his famous novel The Catcher in the Rye.18
While it is unclear whether the derivative work right is a necessary
economic incentive for authors, it does give original authors a high level of
control over the future of the copyrighted work. The right to control
potential adaptations of the work may be a crucial incentive for certain
authors. For instance, some authors may only write a new book with the
assurance that the integrity of the work can be maintained with the right to
12

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
701, 750 (2010) (“Sequels generally are derivative works . . . .”).
14
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(relying on a definition of a sequel as a literary work which continues the narrative of a preceding
work).
15
John M. Newman, Note, Holden Caulfield Grows Up: Salinger v. Colting, The Promotion-ofProgress Requirement, and Market Failure in a Derivative-Works Regime, 96 IOWA L. REV. 737, 745
(2011).
16
Id.
17
Id. at 745–46.
18
See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Salinger has never permitted, and has
explicitly instructed his lawyers not to allow, adaptations of his works.”).
13
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manage all derivatives of the copyrighted material, such as films or
sequels.
B. Length of Protection
Currently, the copyright protection lasts for the life of the author plus
seventy years.19 The period of protection has continued to expand since
the inception of copyright law. The Copyright Act of 1909 granted federal
copyright protection for twenty-eight years, and an additional twenty-eight
years upon timely renewal.20 Under the Copyright Act of 1976,
[w]orks then in the first term or the renewal term of
copyright under the 1909 Act had their term of protection
potentially extended to 75 years. Works created on or after
January 1, 1978, or first published thereafter, were to be
protected for 50 years after the death of the author, and
corporate works were to be protected for 75 years after
publication.21
In 1998, Congress followed the lead of European nations and added
twenty years to the length of copyright protection.22 The Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act extended protection for corporate works
and works protected under the 1909 Act from seventy-five to ninety-five
years.23 It also extended protection for works created after January 1, 1978
from life plus fifty years to life plus seventy years.24 In Eldred v. Ashcroft,
the Supreme Court held that the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1988
did not violate the “limited times” requirement established in the
Constitution.25 Because the length of protection is virtually perpetual, the
consequences of problems within the system are heightened because they
continue for so long.
C. Fair Use
Section 107 places some limitations on the exclusive rights of authors
because others may use the original author’s works if that use constitutes
“fair use.”26 The fair use defense is designed to protect “purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies

19

17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
GORMAN, supra note 8, at 2–3.
21
Id. at 3.
22
Id. at 65.
23
Id. at 5.
24
Id.
25
537 U.S. 186, 199–204 (2003).
26
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (outlining the fair use defense).
20
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for classroom use), scholarship, or research.” In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., the Supreme Court held that parodies may claim fair use under
Section 107.28
Fair use analysis considers four factors:
27

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.29
D. Tensions in Copyright Law
Congress receives its authority to grant copyright protection from
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution. In order to promote the
progress of the arts, Congress can grant authors exclusive rights to
copyrightable subject matter for limited times.30 The promotion of
progress of the arts is challenged by the complexity of balancing the
incentive necessary for authors and publishers to create and distribute new
works against the availability of these works to the public. Tension also
exists between granting authors exclusive rights to their works and the
First Amendment’s commitment to freedom of speech.31
United States courts have recognized the tensions within copyright
law, and often emphasize the ultimate goals of congressional power and
the Copyright Act in their opinions. The Supreme Court stated that the
ultimate goal of copyright law is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.”32 The means to achieve this goal is to provide
incentive to authors to create artistic works by granting them a monopoly.
Specifically, the limited grant of exclusive rights “is intended to motivate
the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”33 Congress’s task of
serving the public good with ultimate access to artistic works requires a
difficult balance between the interests of authors “in the control and
exploitation of their [works]” and “society’s competing interest in the free
27

Id.
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
29
17 U.S.C. § 107.
30
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
31
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
32
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
33
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
28
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flow of ideas, information, and commerce.”
In its opinion in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, Co., the Eleventh
Circuit identified three main goals of copyright law: “the promotion of
learning, the protection of the public domain, and the granting of an
exclusive right to the author.”35 The court explained that copyright law
promotes learning by guarding against censorship and by incentivizing
authors to create new works, which together promote public access to new
ideas and concepts.36 Copyright law protects the public domain because it
ensures that artistic works enter the public domain after the limited
exclusive rights expire.37 Finally, copyright grants authors these exclusive
rights “to encourage the creation of original works.”38
On their face the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment are
inherently in conflict.39 While copyright law provides incentive for the
creation and distribution of creative works, copyright law “also burdens
speech. We often copy or build upon another’s words, images, or music to
convey our own ideas effectively. We cannot do that if a copyright holder
withholds permission or insists upon a license fee that is beyond our
means.”40 The balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright
Clause is supposedly served by copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy and
the fair use doctrine.41 Copyright protection can be granted only to
expression and not to ideas.42 Furthermore, the fair use doctrine protects
First Amendment values because the purposes allowed under the fair use
analysis “allow later authors to use a previous author’s copyright to
introduce new ideas or concepts to the public.”43 The following cases
demonstrate how these safeguards are inadequate with regard to the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works, particularly because current
law makes a problematic distinction between parody and satire and ignores
the intentions of copyright owners.44
34

34

Id.
268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001).
36
Id. at 1261–62.
37
Id. at 1262.
38
Id.
39
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
40
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 3 (2008).
41
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1263.
42
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (concluding that copyright for a blank accounting
book did not grant the owner the exclusive right over the accounting method).
43
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1264.
44
While this Note does not examine the exclusive right to reproduction, problems with the
derivative works right may also arise from the reproduction right.
35
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III. TWO CASES
Two recent cases involving literary works which were substantially
similar to the novels of previous authors raise questions about the ways in
which current law is succeeding or failing to achieve the goals of
copyright. In both cases, a subsequent author wrote what can arguably be
deemed a sequel to an original author’s work.45 In one case, the court
found that the work was a parody and therefore had a valid fair use
defense.46 In a case nine years later, the court found that the “sequel” was
a satire, and therefore did not constitute fair use.47 Ironically, both authors
pulled characters, relationships, settings, famous scenes, and even dialogue
from the original novel.48
A. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.
In Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed about whether Alice Randall’s novel, The Wind Done Gone,
constituted fair use of Margaret Mitchell’s novel, Gone with the Wind.49
Suntrust Bank brought suit as “the trustee of the Mitchell Trust, which
holds the copyright in [Gone with the Wind].”50 The Trusts actively
managed the copyright, and previously authorized derivative works of the
novel, including a sequel.51
Alice Randall’s novel The Wind Done Gone uses characters and scenes
from Gone with the Wind.52 The work is told from the perspective of a
slave named Cynara, the daughter of a Gone with the Wind character,
Mammy, and the half-sister of the character Other, who represents
Mitchell’s character of Scarlet in Gone with the Wind.53 In the book,
Cynara has a relationship with the character representing Rhett Butler from
Gone with the Wind.54 In the end, Cynara inherits the plantation where she
45
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing the various elements which
Fredrik Colting used from J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267
(explaining that Alice Randall used multiple features from Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind).
46
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1277.
47
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83.
48
Id. at 72; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267.
49
Compare Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269–76 (concluding that “[The Wind Done Gone] is
entitled to a fair-use defense” after analyzing the fair use factors), with Suntrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1370–84 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (concluding that Suntrust Bank would
likely succeed on its infringement claim).
50
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259.
51
Id.
52
Note, Gone with the Wind Done Gone: “Re-Writing” and Fair Use, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1193,
1194 (2002).
53
Id.
54
Id.
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grew up, “Tata,” which is similar to Gone with the Wind’s “Tara.”55 Other
characters and places also appear in both novels.56
Alice Randall admitted to appropriating elements from Gone with the
Wind, but she claimed that the use was necessary for her critique of the
depiction of slavery and the Civil War era American South in Mitchell’s
novel.57 In her declaration to the court, Randall explained:
In order to effectively debunk the harmful and offensive view
of black people portrayed throughout Gone with the Wind, I
thus had to create a work that would comment on the
pervasiveness of that view in the book, in part by pointing
out and dissecting for the reader the elements of that book—
characters, scenes and even carefull [sic] selected lines of
dialogue—that help perpetuate that view.58
Randall claimed to target Gone with the Wind for her parody because
more than any other work she knew, it “presented and helped perpetuate an
image of the South” that she “felt compelled to comment upon and
criticize.”59 This compulsion for commentary and criticism could be
similar to Fredrik Colting’s desire to comment on the quirks of Holden
Caulfield and the way in which J.D. Salinger became a recluse.60 Under
the current copyright system, however, Randall’s criticism was freely
shared with the rest of the public while Colting’s was barred from
distribution.61
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
and the Eleventh Circuit disagreed about whether Mitchell’s estate should
have been granted an injunction against the publication and distribution of
the allegedly infringing book.62 This contrast in opinion boiled down to

55

Id.
See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267 (“[The Wind Done Gone] appropriates numerous
characters, settings, and plot twists from [Gone with the Wind].”).
57
Id. at 1259.
58
Declaration of Alice Randall at 6, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d
1357 (2001) (No. 1:01 CV-701-CAP).
59
Id. at 1.
60
See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing Colting’s claim that his
novel was not a sequel, but rather a critique of Salinger).
61
See id. at 83 (concluding that on remand Salinger was likely to succeed on infringement claim
and Colting was unlikely to succeed with fair use defense); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1277 (finding an
injunction to be an inappropriate remedy because The Wind Done Gone has a viable fair use defense).
62
Compare Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1276 (finding the district court erred by presuming
irreparable injury simply because there was a likelihood of copyright infringement without properly
considering the success of a fair-use defense), with Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F.
Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction which “enjoined [Houghton
Mifflin Company] from further production, display, distribution, advertising, sale, or offer for sale of
the book The Wind Done Gone”).
56
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the courts’ differing assessments of the fair use analysis. The fair use
analysis considers the purpose and the character of the work, the nature of
the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion of the
work used, and finally, the effect on the market value of the original.64
63

1. Purpose and Character of the Work
The biggest discrepancy between the district court and the appellate
court was in their treatment of the first factor.65 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., the Supreme Court held that in examining the purpose and
character of the use, the critical question is whether the secondary work is
transformative.66 A finding that the secondary work is transformative is
not dispositive of fair use, but the more transformative the work, the less
other factors, such as a commercial purpose, will weigh against a finding
of fair use.67
The district court found that the first factor weighed in favor of the
plaintiff because of the commercial purpose of The Wind Done Gone.68
The district court also found, however, that the work was somewhat
transformative and would therefore not give the first factor undue weight.69
The district court concluded that while Randall’s book criticized Gone with
the Wind in part, the overall purpose of the work was “to create a sequel to
the older work and provide Ms. Randall’s social commentary to the
antebellum South. The work retells the earlier story in a condensed
version from a different perspective but, in truth, merely encapsulates the
same story while adding new twists.”70 The district court found that The
Wind Done Gone contained transformative parodic elements that generally
criticized the earlier work and the antebellum South, but the transformation
was no more than that resulting from a sequel to an original work. 71 The
district court emphasized the Supreme Court’s holding in Campbell that a
parody must comment on an author’s work,72 and found that Randall did
not simply seek to criticize the treatment of African Americans in Gone
with the Wind, but to give a more general criticism of the treatment of
African Americans in the South.73
63
See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1276–77 (stating that a fair use defense was likely to prevail
because of a lack of irreparable injury and because comment and criticism are generally protected).
64
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
65
See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271 (finding the new work had to include much of the original
to effectively be a parody, and was thus transformative); Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. at 1378 (holding
the new work is primarily a sequel and its transformative nature has little effect on that characteristic).
66
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
67
Id.
68
Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1378.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 1372 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81).
73
Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1377–78.
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To support its claim that the work was closer to a sequel than a parody,
the district court looked to a dictionary definition of a sequel: “a literary
work continuing the course of a narrative begun in a preceding one.”74 The
district court went on to conclude that The Wind Done Gone satisfied this
definition because it used the fifteen main characters from Gone with the
Wind, gave explanation and further details about what happened in the first
work, and then explained what happened to them later on.75 The district
court was not satisfied with the argument that because the work was told
through Cynara’s perspective, it was not a sequel. The district court found
that “[i]f the work is intended to supply the missing story of the earlier
work and takes up where the former work left off, then it is a sequel,” and
therefore an infringement of the copyright owner’s derivative work.76
In contrast to the district court, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that The
Wind Done Gone was a parody of Gone with the Wind, not a sequel, and
therefore was highly transformative.77 The Eleventh Circuit determined
that Randall’s work was a statement seeking “to rebut and destroy the
perspective, judgments, and mythology of [Gone with the Wind].”78 The
court of appeals also noted that Randall tells the story through a different
viewpoint, that Randall’s language is vastly different from Mitchell’s
prose, and that the events from the original work are transformed into a
new tale.79 The Eleventh Circuit held that Randall used the tools of parody
to “make war” against Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind.80
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Both courts agreed that the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted
work, weighed in favor of the copyright holder because Gone with the
Wind should be afforded greater protection as a work of fiction.81 The
Eleventh Circuit gave the factor little weight, however, because it was a
parody case, and “parodies almost invariably copy publicly known,
expressive works.”82
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion of the Work Used
Application of the third factor was another point of disagreement
between the district court and the court of appeals. The third factor
74

Id. at 1375 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
76
Id. at 1377.
77
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001).
78
Id. at 1270.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1271.
81
Id.; Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.
82
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
586 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75
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considers the amount and substantiality of the portion used in the
secondary work in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.83 The
Supreme Court in Campbell explained that this factor requires courts to
consider the reasonableness of the quantity and value of the material in
light of the purpose of the copying.84 The Court recognized that parodies
present an interesting situation because “the parody must be able to
‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original to make the object of its
critical wit recognizable.”85
The district court found that the amount and substantiality of the work
used weighed against a finding of fair use.86 The district court concluded
that Randall used too much copyrighted material to criticize Mitchell’s
portrait of Southern history in Gone with the Wind.87 By including “the
original work’s plot, themes, characters, character traits, settings, scenes,
descriptive phrases, and verbatim quotes,” Randall went beyond what was
necessary to parody Mitchell’s work and crossed into the realm of piracy.88
The Eleventh Circuit was not convinced that Randall appropriated too
much copyrighted material, nor was the court convinced that Randall did
not. The court of appeals noted several instances in which Randall used
elements of Gone with the Wind and transformed them in The Wind Done
Gone for purposes of commentary.89 The Eleventh Circuit considered the
argument that Randall took more than was necessary to parody Gone with
the Wind.90 On appeal, the court explained that the use is not necessarily
infringing if it does more than conjure up the work, but that fair use
depends on other factors such as the overriding purpose of the use and the
likelihood that the parody will be a market substitute for the original. 91
The Eleventh Circuit concluded, however, that the record did not support a
finding one way or the other about the reasonableness of the quantity and
value of the materials used in relation to the purpose of the work.92
4. Effect of the Market Value on the Original
The fourth and final factor resulted in another split between the district
court and the Eleventh Circuit. The fourth factor calls for an analysis of
“the effect of the use upon on the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work,” including both harm to the market for the original and
83

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
85
Id. at 588.
86
Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
87
Id. at 1380–81.
88
Id. at 1381.
89
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001).
90
See id. at 1272 (considering the particular elements taken from the original for the parody).
91
Id. at 1273.
92
Id. at 1274.
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for derivative works. The fact that the commentary might be successful
in killing demand for the original or derivative works is not the type of
harm the courts are concerned with.94
The district court found that while the parodic intent of the work may
have been substantial, it did not compare to the potential harm due to the
extensive copying.95 Because the district court found that the work was
more similar to a sequel than a parodic commentary, that court held that
the fourth factor weighed against a finding of fair use.96 In contrast, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Mitchell’s estate did not establish that The
Wind Done Gone would act as a market substitute for Gone with the Wind
or significantly harm its derivative market.97
Despite the promising verdict of the Eleventh Circuit, Houghton
Mifflin Company agreed to a settlement with the estate of Margaret
Mitchell in May of 2002.98 At the request of the Mitchell Trusts, a
contribution was made to Morehouse College and the copies of The Wind
Done Gone would continue to be labeled an unauthorized parody.99
B. Salinger v. Colting
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
and the Second Circuit both held that author Fredrik Colting would not
likely prevail in a fair use defense against claims of copyright infringement
for his use of material from J.D. Salinger’s novel, The Catcher in the
Rye.100 The Catcher in the Rye (“Catcher”) tells the story of a sixteenyear-old, Holden Caulfield, who wanders around New York City for
several days after being expelled from school. The story is told from
Holden’s perspective and throughout the novel there is a tension between
Holden’s cynical view of “a world full of phonies and crooks and his love
of family.”101 Colting’s novel, 60 Years Later, Coming Through the Rye
(“60 Years Later”), tells the story of seventy-six-year-old Mr. C “in a
world that includes Mr. C’s ninety-year-old author, a ‘fictionalized
Salinger.’”102 The two works share similarities including:
93
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4)
(2006)).
94
Id. at 592–93 (considering the argument that Randall took more than was necessary to parody
the original work).
95
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
96
Id.
97
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1276.
98
David D. Kirkpatrick, Mitchell Estate Settles ‘Gone With the Wind’ Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2002, at C6.
99
Id.
100
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010); Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250,
268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
101
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 70–71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102
Id. at 71–72.
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Mr. C is Holden Caulfield. Mr. C narrates like Holden,
references events that happened to Holden, and shares many
of Holden’s notable eccentricities. Also, Mr. C’s adventures
parallel those of Holden.
Both characters leave an
institution, wander around New York City for several days,
reconnect with old friends, find happiness with Phoebe, and
ultimately return to a different institution. Finally, within
these broader structural similarities, the novels contain
similar scenes . . . .103
A significant difference between the two novels is that 60 Years Later
includes a fictionalized Salinger who is haunted by his literary creation.104
Salinger wishes to bring Caulfield back to life so that he can kill him. 105 In
the end, Caulfield meets Salinger in his home and the author, unable to kill
him, decides to set him free.106
Salinger was adamantly against derivative works involving Holden
Caulfield. He specifically instructed his lawyers not to allow any
adaptations of his works.107 Colting argued that 60 Years Later was not a
sequel, but rather a commentary on the portrayal of Holden Caulfield in
Catcher, and on the relationship between Salinger and his created
character. Colting suggested that as the author grew old he “remain[ed]
imprisoned by the literary character he created.”108
Given the
transformative nature of this commentary, and the role of the Salinger
character, Colting argued that the use of material from Catcher constituted
fair use.109 Both the district court and court of appeals disagreed with
Colting.110
1. Purpose and Character of the Work
The district court found that the first factor, the nature and purpose of
the work, weighed against a finding of fair use.111 The district court found
that there was an obvious commercial use because it was to be sold for
profit.112 In addition, the district court concluded that the novel was not a
parody, and while it did contain some transformative elements because of
the use of the Salinger character to comment on the author, it was not
103

Id. at 72 (citation omitted).
Id. at 71–72.
105
Id. at 72.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 71.
108
Id. at 72 (quoting Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 10, Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878-CV)).
109
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
110
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73–74; Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
111
Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 263.
112
Id.
104
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113

enough to weigh in favor of fair use.
Specifically, the district court
rejected Colting’s classification of his work as a parody of Catcher and its
author because the work contained no specific criticism of a character or
theme in Catcher.114 Rather, the district court concluded that Colting
reiterated the same themes and traits found in Holden Caulfield in
Salinger’s original story, instead of exposing them or commenting on
them.115 The district court found that “[i]t is hardly parodic to repeat that
same exercise in contrast, just because society and the characters have
aged.”116
The district court further concluded that the use of Salinger as a
character was novel, but that it was not a parody because it critiqued the
reclusive nature of Salinger and his zealous protection of his intellectual
property.117 Parody criticizes the work, however, and therefore a criticism
of Salinger did not constitute parody.118
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work, Amount and Substantiality of the
Portion of the Work Used, and the Effect of the Market Value on
the Original
The district court also concluded that the second factor weighed
against a finding of fair use because Catcher is a creative work of fiction,
and therefore entitled to strong copyright protection.119 Furthermore, the
court found that the third factor weighed against a finding of fair use
because Colting took more than was necessary from Catcher for the
purpose of criticizing Salinger.120 In addition to the similarities between
Holden and Mr. C, the district court found that the use of “similar and
sometimes nearly identical supporting characters, settings, tone, and plot
devices” was “unnecessarily high” for the alleged purpose.121
Finally, the district court concluded that the potential harm to the
market of the original work also weighed against a finding of fair use
because Colting’s book had the potential to harm the market for sequels
and other derivative works.122 In light of the fact that Salinger was
adamant that there should never be any derivative works to Catcher, it is
ironic that the district court concerned itself with harm to a market for
works that would be highly unlikely to come.
113

Id. at 262–63.
Id. at 258.
115
Id. at 258–60.
116
Id. at 259.
117
Id. at 261.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 263.
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Id. at 267.
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Id. at 264–66.
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Id. at 268.
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Ultimately, the district court decided that Colting was not likely to
succeed with a fair use defense and therefore granted the requested
preliminary injunction against the “manufacturing, publishing, distributing,
shipping, advertising, promoting, selling, or otherwise disseminating any
copy of 60 Years or any portion thereof, in or to the United States.”123 The
Second Circuit agreed that 60 Years Later was not likely to constitute fair
use, supporting the district court’s conclusion that Colting’s assertion that
the primary purpose of the novel was to critique Salinger was not
credible.124 The court of appeals remanded for a reevaluation of the
preliminary injunction consistent with its holding that the standards laid
out by the Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. and
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council apply to copyright
infringement.125
Colting reached a settlement with Salinger’s literary estate in
December 2010.126 The settlement prohibited Colting from publishing or
distributing the work in the United States or Canada, but freed him to sell
the book in other international territories.127 Colting also agreed to change
the title from “Coming Through the Rye,” and make no dedication of the
book to Salinger.128 Moreover, the settlement prohibited “Colting or any
publisher of the book from referring to The Catcher in the Rye, Salinger,
the book being ‘banned’ by Salinger, or from using the litigation to
promote the book.”129
C. Comparing the Two Cases
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. and Salinger v. Colting are
similar because both cases involve an action to enjoin a secondary author
from publishing a derivative work to an original author’s novel.130
Furthermore, both secondary authors, Randall and Colting, appropriated
characters, settings, and even some dialogue from the original works.131
Finally, both cases are analogous in that both Randall and Colting asserted
the affirmative defense of fair use132—the defense resulted in the court’s
123

Id. at 268–69.
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010).
125
Id. at 84.
126
Andrew Albanese, J.D. Salinger Estate, Swedish Author Settle Copyright Suit, PUBLISHERS
WKLY. (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publishernews/article/45738-j-d-salinger-estate-swedish-author-settle-copyright-suit.html.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 71–72; Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259
(11th Cir. 2001).
131
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 72; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1267.
132
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 72–73; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1259.
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analysis of the four fair use factors, including whether the secondary works
were transformative parodies.133
The significant difference between the two cases is that the Eleventh
Circuit found that The Wind Done Gone was a parody of Gone with the
Wind,134 and the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that critique
was not the purpose of 60 Years Later.135 The Eleventh Circuit found The
Wind Done Gone very transformative because it was a parody of
Mitchell’s novel.136 By fitting the novel into the parody niche, the
Eleventh Circuit was able to weigh the first factor in favor of fair use. 137
By contrast, the district court concluded that The Wind Done Gone was not
a parody of Mitchell’s novel, and found that it was not transformative
enough to constitute fair use.138 Likewise, the Second Circuit upheld the
finding of United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York that 60 Years Later was not sufficiently transformative because it did
not parody Catcher.139 The courts agreed that the novel was transformative
because Colting satirized Salinger’s life, but that this transformative
element was not adequate to weigh in favor of fair use.140
As evidenced by these cases, where the court concluded that the work
was a parody, and not a satire or general criticism, more weight was given
towards a finding of fair use. By contrast, satires were not considered to be
very transformative. This difference in weight was a result of the
distinction between parody and satire made by the Supreme Court in
Campbell.141 As a result of this distinction, creativity is stifled and the
public suffers the loss of new works with different perspectives. This is
problematic to the overall goal of copyright: serving the public good.
In both Suntrust Bank and Salinger, a consideration of the future
intentions of the copyright owner with regard to derivative works did not
play a substantial role. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia reviewed the Mitchell Trusts’ past actions with regard
to authorizing sequels,142 and mentioned the Trust’s authorization of
133
See supra Part III.A (discussing the Eleventh Circuit and district court’s fair use analysis in
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company); supra Part III.B (discussing the Second Circuit and
district court’s fair use analysis in Salinger v. Colting).
134
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271.
135
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 83.
136
See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271 (noting the social benefit provided by Randall’s
commentary on an earlier work).
137
Id.
138
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
139
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73, 83; Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261, 263 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
140
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73; Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
141
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994) (explaining that
parodies must mimic the original, whereas satires can stand on their own).
142
Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1363–64.
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sequels in the analysis of the fourth fair use factor, but the district court did
not consider its future plans.143 In Salinger, the courts disregarded
Salinger’s intentions to not create or license any derivative works of
Catcher.144 By ignoring the fact that the copyright owner would prevent
the publication of new works, the Second Circuit ensured that the ultimate
goal of copyright would not be achieved. There should be a more formal
consideration of copyright owners’ intentions with regard to the derivative
works right in order for courts and the U.S. Copyright Office to better
manage the publishing of derivative works for public discourse.
IV. PARODY V. SATIRE
One of the inherent problems with the fair use analysis is the
distinction courts draw between parody and satire. Courts should eliminate
the parody/satire dichotomy because both parodies and satires share a
common purpose of comment or criticism, these purposes are important to
the public, and a copyright owner may be just as unwilling to give
permission for a parody as for a satire.
A. Common Purpose
The fair use defense protects works with such purposes as criticism or
commentary.145 In Campbell, the Supreme Court held that “parody, like
other comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107.”146 While
both parodies and satires aim to criticize or comment, courts are more
willing to find parodies to be fair use.147 Courts rely on the distinction the
Supreme Court made in Campbell. For the purpose of copyright law, the
Court defined parody as “the use of some elements of a prior author’s
143
See id. at 1382 (noting that the Trust has authorized derivative works in the past, but not
mentioning any future plans for derivative works).
144
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 74 (citing Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268).
145
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
146
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
147
See Juli Wilson Marshall & Nicholas J. Siciliano, The Satire/Parody Distinction in Copyright
and Trademark Law—Can a Satire Ever Be a Fair Use?, ABA Section of Litig. Intell. Prop.
Litig. Comm. 3, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/intellectual/roundtables/
0506_outline.pdf (explaining that courts are “transfixed by the apparent dichotomy in Campbell
between parody and satire”); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81 (“Parody needs to mimic an
original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective
victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the
very act of borrowing.”); Salinger, 607 F.3d at 73 (“60 Years Later does not parody Catcher or the
Holden character, and although it might parody Salinger, that is insufficient because according to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell, parody must critique or comment on the work itself.” (citations
omitted)); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing
that parody justifiably borrows from the original work and satire does not); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that The Cat NOT in the Hat!
is not transformative because the work does not hold the Dr. Seuss characteristic style up to ridicule).
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composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
author’s works.”148 In contrast, the Court stated that other forms of
commentary borrowing from original works, including satire, which have
“no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition,
which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the
drudgery in working up something fresh” have less claim to fair use.149
Parodists have better claim to the fair use defense because they are
commenting on the original work, whereas satirists are commenting on
something broader. While the Court in Campbell weighed all of the
factors in analyzing fair use, other courts rely heavily on the dichotomy the
Court created between parody and satire. The trend in courts is that
if the new work arguably criticized or commented on the
original, a parodic character reasonably can be perceived . . .
the other factors concurrently become less important, and a
fair use finding is quick to follow. On the other hand, if the
new work used the original work as a mere vehicle to
criticize something else (such as society in general), it is
satire, not parody, and therefore not fair use.150
In spite of this distinction, both parodies and satires share a common
purpose—commentary—that is protected under the fair use defense.151
Alice Randall attempted to criticize Margaret Mitchell’s depiction of
slavery and the South, and Fredrik Colting attempted to criticize J.D.
Salinger and his desperate protection of the Holden Caulfield character. In
both instances, the courts relied on the Supreme Court’s distinction
between parody and satire. The Eleventh Circuit found that Randall
criticized Gone with the Wind, and The Wind Done Gone was therefore a
parody because it critiqued a preexisting work.152 In contrast, Colting used
the work to critique Salinger, and not Catcher. Colting clearly criticized
Salinger and made a comment on Catcher.153 Because the fair use analysis
calls for a balancing test, it cannot be said that the courts found the fact that
Colting wrote a satiric sequel and not a parody dispositive of copyright
infringement.154 But the Eleventh Circuit was certainly generous with The
Wind Done Gone as it, as well as Suntrust Bank, fit it into the parody
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Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
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Marshall & Siciliano, supra note 147, at 3.
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17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271.
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Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81 n.14 (explaining that in light of the other fair use factors
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155

niche.
A significant result of the parody/satire dichotomy is the post-hoc
realization by attorneys and judges to classify derivative works as parodies
in order to find fair use. Courts’ preference for parody over satire
corresponds with “a tendency for both lawyers and judges to couch any
work it deems a fair use as a parody.” 156 This is particularly problematic
because many works tend to resist classification. Like The Wind Done
Gone and 60 Years Later, many works combine satiric and parodic
elements to comment generally on or to criticize an original work and
something broader. For example, the Eleventh Circuit found that The
Wind Done Gone was specifically a criticism of Mitchell’s depiction of
slavery in Gone with the Wind.157 In contrast, the district court found that
the work was not merely a criticism of the treatment of African-Americans
in Gone with the Wind, “but also [a] comment upon the treatment of black
Americans in the South in the 1930’s, 1940’s and 1950’s as well as
today.”158 Relying on Campbell, the district court concluded that the work
would not gain fair use protection as a parody if it simply used the work to
ridicule a broader subject.159 The district court would not find The Wind
Done Gone a parody because “the parodical work must parody the work
itself and not other general concepts and ideas about the way black
Americans have been and are treated in the South.”160 In light of the
difficulty of classifying works as a parody or a satire, it is illogical to
create a bright line between the two. The parody/satire dichotomy
encourages lawyers and judges to create a bright line where none exists.
B. Both Forms of Critique Are Important to the Public
The Supreme Court has emphasized that this country strives for “the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources.”161 Criticism and commentary—of artistic and non-artistic works
alike—are important to the dissemination of information and the resulting
discussion. In its opinion in Suntrust Bank, the Eleventh Circuit identified
“one of the most important purposes to consider [as] the free flow of
ideas—particularly criticism and commentary.”162 The fair use statute
155

See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1376–77 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(explaining that the former cover of The Wind Done Gone did not describe the work as a parody, and
the new cover was changed to explicitly advertise the work as a parody before the plaintiff’s motion for
a temporary restraining order).
156
Marshall & Siciliano, supra note 147, at 6.
157
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1270.
158
Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.
159
Id. at 1377–78.
160
Id. at 1378.
161
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 192 (1997) (citations omitted).
162
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268.
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makes no distinction between commentary and criticism of copyrighted
works or other subject matter.163 This proves that commentary and
criticism are generally worthy of protection, not just commentary or
criticism of copyrighted works.
C. Licenses for a Derivative Work
The underlying theory of protecting parodies under fair use is that a
copyright owner would license an author to use his or her work for satire,
but not for parody.164 It rests on the notion that a copyright owner would
be willing to license his work as a vehicle for broader social commentary
(satire), but not to criticize his or her own work (parody).165 This theory is
logical, but inaccurate. For example, J.D. Salinger would not allow
Colting the use of Catcher to create a satire.166 Furthermore, several artists
gave licenses to Weird Al Yankovic to parody their music.167 Dimension
Films also gave a license to the parody, Scary Movie, based on Dimension
Films’ own movie Scream.168
A broader, but more accurate theory would not distinguish between
parody and satire. Rather, it should be said that a secondary author who
wants to create a derivative work that will reflect negatively on the original
work will be unlikely to secure a license from the copyright owner.169 In
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books, the authors of The Cat NOT in the
Hat!, a book satirizing the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial, did not seek
permission from Seuss Enterprises to use its copyrighted books.170 In the
resulting lawsuit,
Dr. Seuss’s motivation in seeking to enjoin Penguin’s book
was to avoid having the reputation of its works damaged by
the sordid events of the Simpson murders. Given the
negative reflection this kind of use creates, the original
author is unlikely to voluntarily grant a license at any
163

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
Marshall & Siciliano, supra note 147, at 5.
165
Id.
166
See supra Part III.B (discussing Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that “Salinger has not
demonstrated any interest in publishing a sequel or other derivative work of Catcher”).
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Marshall & Siciliano, supra note 147, at 5.
168
Id.
169
See Jason M. Vogel, Note, The Cat in the Hat’s Latest Bad Trick: The Ninth Circuit’s
Narrowing of the Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 310–11 (1998) (“[I]n an ordinarily functioning market a
subsequent author wishing to create a socially-valuable (and thus economically-viable) derivative work
will be able to secure a license from the original author, who presumably will be inclined to permit any
wealth-producing use. However, in certain circumstances, where the subsequent use reflects negatively
on the original author, she will be disinclined to license the use at any price.” (footnote omitted)).
170
109 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997).
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price.

In Salinger, the copyright owner was unwilling to grant a license for
any derivative work,172 but it was even more unlikely to license a work that
reflected negatively on Salinger himself. In Suntrust Bank, the Mitchell
Trusts authorized sequels to Gone with the Wind, but sought to enjoin
Randall from publishing the negatively skewed The Wind Done Gone.173
The ultimate settlement suggests that for a certain price the Mitchell Trusts
might have licensed the alleged parody, but there is no guarantee that
either party would have agreed without a lawsuit.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that “copyright laws were enacted in part to
prevent private censorship.”174 The derivative work right gives authors the
right to an indirect censorship power because copyright owners have
excessive control over subsequent works that may reflect negatively on the
original work. The concurring judge in the Eleventh Circuit opinion in
Suntrust Bank rejected granting authors the power of indirect censorship.175
The judge expressed particular concern over empowering copyright owners
to block the publication of critical derivative works.176 The Eleventh
Circuit successfully prevented the Mitchell Trusts from prohibiting a
critical examination of Gone with the Wind, but J.D. Salinger was able to
stop Colting from publishing a work that was critical of him.
Distinguishing between parodies and satires gives authors greater indirect
censorship power because courts are more likely to find parodies to be fair
use than satires. Therefore, satiric works which may reflect negatively on
the original work, but are important to the public discourse, are prevented
from publication.
D. Overcoming the Challenge to Removing the Distinction Between
Parody and Satire
A major challenge to the idea of removing the distinction between
parody and satire is the Court’s justification in Campbell that “[p]arody
needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use
the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas
171

Vogel, supra note 169, at 313 (footnote omitted).
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 71 (2d. Cir. 2010).
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Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363–64 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
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Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001).
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Id. at 1283 (Marcus, J., concurring) (“The law grants copyright holders a powerful monopoly
in their expressive works. It should not also . . . grant them a power of indirect censorship.”).
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See id. (“Copyright law is not designed to stifle critics. Destructive parodies play an important
role in social and literary criticism and thus merit protection even though they may discourage or
discredit an original author.”); see also Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 n.3
(2d Cir. 1998) (“Because the social good is served by increasing the supply of criticism—and thus,
potentially, of truth—creators of original works cannot be given the power to block the dissemination
of critical derivative works.”).
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satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the
very act of borrowing.”177 The Court’s claim rests on the notion that
parody comments on the author’s work and satire comments on something
outside of the work.178 Parodists must use the original work, whereas
satirists can use various original works, or none at all. While this idea is
logical, it is counterproductive to the promotion of the arts because it
stifles creativity. Colting chose to satirize the life of J.D. Salinger.179 It is
possible that Colting could have written a satire about Salinger without
reference to any original work, but Salinger is known for his writing,
particularly Catcher. Without the use of Catcher and the character of
Holden Caulfield, the effect of Colting’s satire may be lost. Theoretically
a “satire can stand on its own two feet,”180 but authors may find it more
effective to use a previous work that will conjure up themes, ideas, and
images for the audience. The Court stated that a satire required a
“justification for the very act of borrowing.”181 Promoting creativity for
the good of the public is a valid justification that should not be ignored.
V. PROPOSAL FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE INTENTIONS OF
COPYRIGHT OWNERS FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS
A. Reasons to Consider the Intentions of Copyright Owners
Another solution to promote the publication of new works is for the
U.S. Copyright Office and the courts to consider the copyright owner’s
intentions with regard to the derivative work right. Suntrust Bank and
Salinger provide two examples of the right to prepare derivative works
creating obstacles to the public’s access to new works. Granting copyright
owners the exclusive right to prepare derivative works does not guarantee
that copyright owners will use the right. For example, the Mitchell Trusts
attempted to prevent Randall’s derivative work, and likewise, Salinger and
later his estate effectively prevented Colting from publishing in the United
States. Moreover, Salinger himself was adamant that he would not create
any derivative works to Catcher or the character of Holden Caulfield.182
When copyright owners do not intend to use the exclusive right to
prepare derivative works, either through their own creation or licensing
others to do so, it can be problematic to the goals of copyright. It acts to
recognize moral rights of literary authors and grants them an indirect
censorship power. Authors like Fredrik Colting are being denied a basic
177

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994).
Id. at 580.
179
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2010).
180
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
181
Id.
182
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 71.
178
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First Amendment right to free speech.
An example from the United Kingdom is illustrative. The United
Kingdom granted a perpetual copyright for J.M. Barrie’s play, Peter Pan,
to the long-term copyright holder, Great Ormond Street Hospital.183
According to author Emily Somma, the work has already entered the
public domain in the United States.184 The play has been used to create
several new works, including the recent movies Hook and Finding
Neverland, as well as a new book written by Somma, After the Rain.185
The creation of these works “illustrate the ability of authors and artists to
build upon previous works.”186 Even still, the Great Ormond Street
Hospital legally opposed the publishing of Somma’s book.187 When a
copyright holder is “able to control such copyrights in perpetuity, the
creation of many new works, of benefit to society for purposes ranging
from entertainment to education to self-enlightenment, [has] to be
aborted.”188 When the copyright owner opposes new derivative works
through a lawsuit or refusal to license the derivative work, the United
States public is denied creative new works that give a fresh perspective to
beloved past works. Likewise, authors are being denied free expression.
Suntrust Bank and Salinger present similar situations because two authors
wrote with a new perspective on stories and characters that have been
integral to American literature. Because of the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works, society is denied the creativity of secondary authors and
individuals are denied the right to freely express themselves.
By taking into account the copyright owner’s intentions, the system
can reduce the frequency of copyright owners stifling creativity of
secondary authors through the refusal to create or license derivative works.
B.

Practical Approaches to Considering the Intentions of Copyright
Owners
1. Renewal of Derivative Rights Work

A practical way to take into account the intentions of the copyright
owner is to require owners to renew the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works. Rather than the right to prepare derivative works lasting
for the life of the author plus seventy years, it should last for a short length

183
Jennifer S. Green, Comment, Copyrights in Perpetuity: Peter Pan May Never Grow Up, 24
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 841, 844 (2006).
184
Id.
185
Id. at 842, 852.
186
Id.
187
See id. at 842 (stating that Somma’s “contemporary novel . . . inspired both litigation and
discussion focusing on copyright issues”).
188
Id. at 852.
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189

of time.
For example, each copyright owner will be granted the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works for ten years. After ten years,
the copyright owner can renew the right by submitting to the U.S.
Copyright Office evidence of the intention to create or license a derivative
work. Trademark law requires owners of the mark to submit an affidavit
that the mark is still being used in commerce, otherwise the mark is
considered abandoned and goes into the public domain.190 By requiring
copyright owners to submit evidence of plans for a derivative work right,
the U.S. Copyright Office can encourage potential new works. The fair
use limitation would continue to protect secondary authors who wish to
create derivative works that are critical of original works and who have
difficulty receiving a license.
2.

Adding a Fair Use Analysis Factor that Considers the Intentions
of the Copyright Owner

Another possibility is to add a fifth factor into the fair use analysis in
cases involving derivative works. The factor would consider the intentions
of the copyright owner. In Salinger, the courts should have given more
weight to a finding of fair use because J.D. Salinger had no intention of
preparing or licensing any derivative works. By considering the intention
of the author, the court is able to consider what will most benefit the
public. The public will receive greater benefit from a new work by a
secondary author than from protecting the moral rights of J.D. Salinger.
In Salinger the courts indirectly recognized the moral rights of J.D.
Salinger. Although the court recognized that Salinger had publicly
disclaimed any intention of authorizing a sequel, the court noted that
Salinger had the right to change his mind and, even if he had no intention
of changing his mind, there is value in the right not to authorize derivative
works.191 The choice not to create derivative works, and not to license
anyone else to create derivative works, serves to protect the integrity of
Catcher. By preventing any derivative works, including those written by
him, “Salinger seemingly wanted to classify Catcher and Caulfield as off189
Another alternative to shortening the period of protection of the derivative works right is to
shorten the length of all copyright protection. The period of protection for copyrighted works should
be shortened. When there are problems in the system it is always better for those problems to last for a
shorter period of time. The length of protection is currently life of the author plus seventy years,
virtually granting copyright owners perpetual protection. As a result, the free expression of new
authors and the public is limited. See generally Green, supra note 183; Matthew A. Kaplan, Note,
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, but Are They Copyrightable?: Protection of Literary
Characters with Respect to Secondary Works, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 817, 838–39 (1999) (proposing that the
length of protection should be limited to the life of the author).
190
15 U.S.C § 1058 (2006); see also Kaplan, supra note 189, at 839 (suggesting that copyright
owners submit proof that they plan on using their works in the future).
191
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d
250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
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limits . . . as if any later use would compromise the integrity of the work
and the character and would alter the vision he had for them at the time of
creation.”192 Salinger’s focus on the integrity of Catcher suggested a
moral-rights objective in his action against Colting. U.S. copyright law
does not traditionally protect moral rights, but rather emphasizes economic
rights.193 Where federal copyright law does recognize moral rights, it
applies to works of visual art, under the protection of the Visual Artists
Rights Act.194 Moral rights are not given to authors of literary works, like
Salinger.195 If courts consider the intentions of copyright owners they can
more effectively make decisions that will lead to the publication of
derivative works.
An alternative to having a fifth factor is to include a consideration of
the copyright owner’s intentions in the fourth factor: the effect on the
market value of the original. In both Suntrust Bank and Salinger the courts
considered the impact on the potential derivatives market.196 If the
copyright owner has no intention of creating derivative works or licensing
others to create them, this factor should weigh in favor of a finding of fair
use.
C. Obstacles to the Effective Consideration of the Intentions of Copyright
Owners
Considering the author’s intentions through a required renewal of the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works or adding a fifth factor to a fair
use analysis in derivative works cases faces two significant obstacles. The
first is that it diminishes the importance of author’s rights. The second is
that it is impractical to know the true intentions of a copyright owner.
1. Diminishing Authors’ Rights
The Second Circuit recognized that Salinger had no intention of
preparing or licensing derivative works. The court decided that Salinger
had a right to change his mind and that there is value to an exclusive right
192
Arlen W. Langvardt & Tara E. Langvardt, Caught in the Copyright Rye: Freeing First
Amendment Interests from the Constraints of the Traditional View, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 99,
138 (2011).
193
Id. at 138.
194
Id. at 139.
195
Id. at 133 (“[M]oral rights are not available to authors of works of the sort at issue in
Salinger.”).
196
See Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 267 (“The inquiry ‘must take account not only of harm to the
original but also of harm to the market for derivative works.’” (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994))); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th
Cir. 2001) (“The final fair-use factor requires us to consider the effect that the publication of [The Wind
Done Gone] will have on the market for or value of Suntrust’s copyright in [Gone with the Wind],
including the potential harm it may cause to the market for derivative works based on GWTW.”).
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to prepare derivative works, but there is also value in the choice to not
authorize these works.197 By requiring copyright owners to renew the right
to prepare derivative works by offering evidence of an intention to do so,
the copyright owner’s option of changing his or her mind is effectively
eliminated. Furthermore, it eliminates the author’s choice to not authorize
any derivative work and isolate the original work as one of a kind. This
may be counterproductive to the promotion of new works because
some artists may be further incentivized to create original
works due to the availability of the right not to produce any
sequels. This might be the case if, for instance, an author’s
artistic vision includes leaving certain portions or aspects of
his character’s story to the varied imaginations of his readers,
or if he hopes that his readers will engage in discussion and
speculation as to what happened subsequently. Just as
licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to
the creation of originals, so too will the right not to license
derivatives sometimes act as an incentive to the creation of
originals.198
By eliminating the option to not license derivative works and maintain the
exclusive right, fewer original authors may be compelled to write.
This is a necessary risk, however. Furthermore, this proposal
maintains the other exclusive rights which act to incentivize new works. In
light of the other incentives artists will continue to create. By considering
the intentions of copyright owners, copyright law can also encourage
artists to be inspired by past works.
The copyright system calls for a balance between creating incentives
for authors, and giving the public access to new works. The Supreme
Court concluded, however, that the ultimate goal of copyright law is “to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”199 As it is,
copyright law gives greater deference to creating incentives for copyright
owners than the need to stimulate artistic output. By considering the
intentions of copyright owners with regard to the opportunity to prepare
derivative works, the copyright system can prevent copyright owners from
stifling future works. If a copyright owner does not see fit to create
derivative works, then a copyright owner should not have the exclusive
right to do so. The ultimate goal of copyright law is to serve the public.
197
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268).
The court explained that while the licensing of derivative works is an economic incentive to produce
originals, the right not to license such works may also be an incentive to the production of originals.
Id.
198
Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
199
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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The public is best served by increased access to new works and fresh
perspectives.
2. Determining the Intentions of Copyright Owners
It may be impractical to determine the true intentions of a copyright
owner because the inquiry is subjective. It would be administratively
difficult for the U.S. Copyright Office to follow up on the activity of every
copyright owner. Copyright owners may feel compelled to submit false
affidavits to renew the right, without any actual intention of following
through. Likewise, copyright owners may submit evidence of intentions
for derivative works to courts that they actually have no intention of
following through with. A multi-factor test would need to be created
which considers past activity and current steps towards a derivative work.
Ultimately, it would take time to perfect the system, but the result would
be beneficial to the public good.
VI. CONCLUSION
In his infinite wisdom J.D. Salinger wrote:
Among other things, you’ll find that you’re not the first
person who was ever confused and frightened and even
sickened by human behavior. You’re by no means alone on
that score, you’ll be excited and stimulated to know. Many,
many men have been just as troubled morally and spiritually
as you are right now. Happily, some of them kept records of
their troubles. You’ll learn from them—if you want to. Just
as someday, if you have something to offer, someone will
learn something from you. It’s a beautiful, reciprocal
arrangement. And it isn’t education. It’s history. It’s
poetry.200
Alice Randall and Fredrik Colting had something to offer to this
“beautiful, reciprocal arrangement.” Unfortunately, the laws of copyright
stood in their way. In the case of Colting’s 60 Years Later the public was
denied the opportunity to learn something from Colting. In the case of
Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, the public is fortunate that Houghton
Mifflin was able to support the high transaction costs of litigation.
The current copyright system is unable to achieve its ultimate goal of
serving the public good with new artistic creation, which can contribute to
the exchange of ideas. United States copyright law grants too much power
and control to authors, particularly in light of the expansive derivative
works right.
200

J.D. SALINGER, THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 189 (1991).
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Both parodies and satires serve important purposes and should be seen
as very transformative in the fair use analysis. By removing the distinction
between the two, the public will have increased access to works of
criticism and commentary.
It is also necessary to consider whether copyright owners intend to
prepare derivative works. It is counterproductive to the goal of creating
new works to grant copyright owners the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works when the owners have no intention of doing so. Creating
incentives for original authors to create work is vitally necessary for the
promotion of the arts. If copyright law continues to allow authors to
prevent other future works, however, without providing his or her own
work, then progress is stifled and the copyright system fails. It is time for
the United States copyright system to realign with its goals and encourage
authors to contribute to the beautiful reciprocal arrangement that benefits
the public good.

